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This symposium poses the question: “Guantanamo Bay: How 
should we respond?”  When I thought about this question, it oc-
curred to me that we talk about “responding” in a number of ways.  
We respond in games, such as chess or bridge.  But the detention pol-
icy of the Bush Administration (“the Administration”) is not a 
game—certainly not from the perspectives of those who are being (or 
have been) detained at Guantánamo Bay for prolonged periods since 
the “global war on terror” began.  We also respond in conversation.  
However, we should not permit rhetoric to distract from action on 
the ground.  Statements of interrogation and detention policy are 
one thing (especially when prepared for public consumption or in 
response to public criticism); interrogation and detention practices 
may be quite another.  We respond in negotiation.  That model, too, 
makes me uncomfortable.  My intuition and my legal training tell me 
that some things should simply not be negotiable, among them cer-
tain absolute commitments to fundamental human rights: freedom 
from cruel, inhuman, and degrading (“CID”) treatment, as well as 
freedom from torture.  This is, after all, the position adopted in two 
core human rights treaties: the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (“ICCPR”),1 and the Convention against Torture and 
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 1 G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 
(Dec. 16, 1966), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_ccpr.htm 
(stating in Article 4 that there can be no derogation from the prohibitions on either 
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Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(“Torture Convention”).2  Finally, and perhaps most charitably, our 
“response” may be viewed as part of the political process—as delib-
erative democracy taking its natural course.  But the political process 
seems to be taking far too long.  There are detainees at Guantánamo 
who have been in United States custody for five years, and every addi-
tional day of detention deepens the profound psychological impact 
on them.3  Three of the Guantánamo detainees have already taken 
their own lives.4  Additionally, at least twenty-five detainees have 
failed in their suicide attempts (in some cases, multiple attempts),5 
while many more are clinically depressed.6
As I contemplated my own response to the Administration’s 
counterterrorism policy for this symposium, I became preoccupied 
with three major concerns.  First, despite my comments above, the 
treatment of detainees at Guantánamo and elsewhere does appear to 
have evolved into a kind of multi-party, multi-dimensional game of 
chess.  The familiar array of players includes the three branches of 
government and the Fourth Estate—at times critical, but often steno-
graphic7—as well as lawyers, academics, and members of human 
rights and civil liberties groups.  However, health professionals at 
Guantánamo Bay—whether nominally serving in a care-giving capac-
ity or as adjuncts to the interrogation mission—are also involved, as 
are their professional organizations.8  A related concern, which I ar-
ticulate further below, is that health professionals—whether physi-
torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment even “[i]n time of public emer-
gency which threatens the life of the nation”). 
 2 G.A. Res. 39/46, annex, 39 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. 
A/39/51 (Dec. 10, 1984) (stating in Article 2(2) that “[n]o exceptional circum-
stances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political insta-
bility or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture”). 
 3 See generally PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, BREAK THEM DOWN: SYSTEMATIC USE 
OF PSYCHOLOGICAL TORTURE BY US FORCES 48–71 (2005), available at 
http://www.physiciansforhumanrights.org/library/documents/reports/break-them-
down-the.pdf (explaining the long-term psychological impact of prolonged isolation 
and aggressive interrogation procedures). 
 4 Josh White, Three Detainees Commit Suicide at Guantanamo, WASH. POST, June 11, 
2006, at A01. 
 5 Id. 
 6 It has been reported that one-fifth of Guantanamo detainees are on anti-
depressants.  See, e.g. Editorial, Inside Guantanamo: How We Survived Jail Hell,  
OBSERVER (London), Mar. 14, 2004, available at http://observer.guardian.co.uk/ 
uk_news/story/0,6903,1168937,00.html. 
 7 See Jonathan H. Marks, Apology or Apologia: The Fourth Estate and the Case for War 
in Iraq, in THE AGE OF APOLOGY: THE WEST FACES ITS OWN PAST (Gibney et al. eds., 
2007). 
 8 The role of professional organizations will be discussed in Part IV, infra. 
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cians, psychologists, nurses, medics, or others—who have served or 
now serve at Guantánamo Bay, have become pawns in the mistreat-
ment of detainees and in the debate over their treatment. 
Second, a substantial part of the “game” of politico-legal move 
and countermove has involved the re-interpretation of the scope, 
meaning, and application of legal norms—particularly international 
legal norms.  Three of the most conspicuous casualties in this process 
have been the definition of torture, the prohibition of cruel, inhu-
man, and degrading treatment and punishment, and the basic pro-
tections in Common Article Three of the Geneva Conventions.9  
When legal protections for detainees are being undermined, it is all 
the more important that professional ethics (in particular, medical 
ethics) speak clearly and that codes of ethics do not become subordi-
nate to, or dependent upon, unilateral reinterpretations of legal doc-
trine.  The ethics of health professionals should embrace fundamen-
tal standards of human rights and the laws of war, as recognized and 
interpreted by the international legal order in whose formation the 
United States played such a pivotal role.10  However, if health profes-
sionals are to retain our trust, and if they are to maintain the social 
and cultural status engendered by their perceived humanitarian 
ethos, their codes of ethics should do more than simply reflect the 
most fundamental legal prohibitions. 
Third, the focus on Guantánamo Bay conveniently distracts at-
tention from other detention centers, such as Bagram in Afghanistan 
and numerous unidentified “black sites” operated by the Central In-
telligence Agency (“CIA”) across the globe11—where interrogation 
practices and the role of health professionals have come under far 
less public scrutiny.  There is a danger that Guantánamo Bay has or 
will become a staged detention center, while more egregious treat-
ment of detainees is conducted elsewhere.  Following the first news-
paper reports about the existence of these “black sites” operated by 
the CIA, one experienced U.S. interrogator observed: 
Its [sic] so nice to be secret.  No trouble over human rights.  So 
secret that most of the military or government have no idea where 
they are.  No rights, human or otherwise have to be dealt with.  
 9 See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 
3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (“Third Geneva Convention”). 
 10 See Jonathan H. Marks, Uphold International Law, RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER, 
Feb. 16, 2003, at A29 (noting the irony of the United States’ efforts to undermine the 
international legal order that the United States worked so hard to establish). 
 11 The President admitted the existence of these sites in September 2006.  See 
Dan Eggen & Dafna Linzer, Secret World of Detainees Grows More Public, WASH. POST, 
Sept. 7, 2006, at A18 (noting that details of the sites remain classified). 
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Let a few inaccessible places be released through controlled me-
dia informants and then AI [Amnesty International] and all the 
rest will be concentrating on those places while we continue to 
work in the real centers.12
 Since details of these detention centers remain undisclosed and 
classified, it is difficult to say much about the role of medical profes-
sionals at those sites.  Although we can speak with some degree of 
confidence about their role at Guantánamo Bay, we should keep in 
mind that we are only talking about one piece of the interrogation 
picture. 
II.     HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND INTERROGATION AT GUANTÁNAMO 
It is possible to describe in some detail the roles that health pro-
fessionals played in the design and implementation of interrogation 
strategies at Guantanamo Bay thanks to the tens of thousands of 
documents obtained by the American Civil Liberties Union 
(“ACLU”) under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), not to 
mention several other documents that have been leaked to the press.  
Since these roles have been described in considerable detail else-
where,13 I review them only briefly here. 
Psychiatrists and psychologists were brought into the interroga-
tion process not as gatekeepers or health care advocates for detain-
ees, but as adjuncts to the interrogation mission.  Although some of 
them clearly had no professional background or training relevant to 
interrogation,14 they were considered “behavioral science consult-
 12 Correspondence between a U.S. Counterintelligence Liaison Officer and Jean 
Maria (2002–2005) (on file at the Project on Ethics and Art in Testimony, Irvine, 
CA) [hereinafter Arrigo Papers].  An additional copy is archived at Intelligence Ethics 
Collection, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University, Stanford, CA (restricted 
until January 1, 2010).  This is, of course, just one interrogator’s view of human 
rights.  The correspondence also indicates that there have been deliberate efforts to 
distract and mislead the press during the war on terror.  Another communication 
states: “[E]mbedded reporters are now being put in one vehicle and taken to staged 
events while the rest of the unit goes to do its job . . . .  The use of names of the pris-
oners will be replaced by codes so nobody can try to trace them.”  Id. 
 13 See, e.g., M. Gregg Bloche & Jonathan H. Marks, When Doctors Go To War, 352 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 3, 3–6 (2005); M. Gregg Bloche & Jonathan H. Marks, Doctors and 
Interrogators at Guantanamo Bay, 353 NEW ENG. J. MED. 6, 6–8 (2005); STEVE H. MILES, 
OATH BETRAYED: TORTURE, MEDICAL COMPLICITY AND THE WAR ON TERROR 43–67 
(2006). 
 14 See, e.g., Bloche & Marks, Doctors and Interrogators at Guantanamo Bay, supra note 
13.  However, some mental health professionals were sent to Survival, Evasion, 
Resistance, and Escape (“SERE”) school where U.S. soldiers are trained to resist in-
terrogation at the hands of enemy captors.  See M. Gregg Bloche & Jonathan H. 
Marks, Doing Unto Others as They Did Unto Us, N. Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2005, at 21; see also 
Jonathan H. Marks, Doctors of Interrogation, 35 HASTINGS CTR. REPORT 17, 18 (2005) 
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ants”15—assigned to teams known colloquially as “Biscuits”16—and 
their input was deemed “essential” in both the design of interroga-
tion strategies and the interpretation of intelligence at Guantánamo 
Bay.17  They advised interrogators how to ramp up interrogation 
stressors in order to overcome the apparent resistance of detainees to 
questioning.18  The kinds of stressors used at Guantánamo Bay are 
now common knowledge, having been the subject of numerous 
newspaper reports and internal U.S. Army (“Army”) investigations.19  
They include sleep deprivation and manipulation, exposure to loud 
noise and temperature extremes, and the use of stress positions.20  
Some reports indicate that behavioral science personnel used infor-
mation derived from detainees’ medical records as the basis for their 
advice.21  In one instance, for example, they advised interrogators to 
exploit a detainee’s fear of the dark.22  Army documents also record 
that behavioral scientists were “on hand” to monitor interrogations, 
and that they were supposedly given the power to intervene if inter-
rogations got out of hand.23
Although there is evidence that Biscuit personnel monitored in-
terrogations both inside and outside the interrogation room24—in 
the latter case through one-way mirrors—there is little evidence that 
they intervened to prevent interrogations from going too far.  On the 
contrary, Army documents suggest that behavioral science personnel 
(as well as some caregivers) stood by while detainees were abused.  
Mohammed Al Qahtani, the so-called “20th hijacker,”25 was exposed 
(discussing whether health professionals were employed for their professional exper-
tise or in order to add an imprimatur of decency to the process). 
 15 Bloche & Marks, Doing Unto Others as They Did Unto Us, supra note 14. 
 16 Marks, supra 14, at 17 (discussing whether health professionals were employed 
for their professional expertise or in order to add an imprimatur of decency to the 
process). 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. at 17–22. 
 20 See, e.g., PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, BREAK THEM DOWN:  SYSTEMATIC USE OF 
PSYCHOLOGICAL TORTURE BY US FORCES (2005), available at http://www.physiciansfor 
humanrights.org/library/documents/reports/break-them-down-the.pdf.  
 21 Neil Lewis, Interrogators Cite Doctors’ Aid at Guantanamo Prison Camp, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 24, 2005, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/24/politics/ 
24gitmo.html?ex=1277265600&en=b1960558c2ad9fa4&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&em
c=rss. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Marks, Doctors of Interrogation, supra note 14, at 18. 
 24 Id. at 17. 
 25 He was not, of course, the only Al Qaeda suspect to be branded “the 20th hi-
jacker.”  See, e.g., Seymour M. Hersh, The Twentieth Man: Has the Justice Department 
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to an aggressive interrogation regime at Guantánamo Bay for up to 
twenty hours per day for forty-eight days over a fifty-four day period at 
the end of 2002 and beginning of 2003.26  The interrogation log—
obtained by Time Magazine—records the presence of a psychologist 
during parts of the interrogation.27  However, the process still spi-
raled out of control, putting Al Qahtani’s health in grave danger.  On 
one occasion, Al Qahtani’s pulse dropped to thirty-five beats per 
minute, and on two occasions his temperature dropped to ninety-five 
degrees.28  To add insult to injury, when Al Qahtani was re-hydrated 
with three bags of intravenous fluids, interrogators refused to let him 
take a bathroom break, and he had no option but to wet himself.29
This is not the only example of medical treatment or its sequelae 
being deployed for strategic purposes.  Force-feeding of hunger strik-
ers at Guantanamo Bay is being conducted with the assistance of 
medical personnel who are caregivers, not adjuncts to the interroga-
tion mission.30  After some U.S. Navy physicians refused to force-feed 
detainees, the Department of Defense began screening doctors as-
signed to Guantanamo Bay to ensure they would be willing to partici-
pate.31  The practice of force-feeding has been defended by the Pen-
tagon as being necessary to protect the health of detainees.32  
However, there are a number of reasons to doubt this claim.  First, 
reports indicate that, in contrast with its use in federal prisons, force-
feeding is being administered long before the health of detainees is 
Mishandled the Case against Zacarias Moussaoui?, NEW YORKER, Sept. 30, 2002, available 
at http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/articles/020930fa_fact. 
 26 ARMY REG. 15-6: FINAL REPORT, INVESTIGATION INTO FBI ALLEGATIONS OF 
DETAINEE ABUSE AT GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA DETENTION FACILITY (as amended June 9, 
2005), 13–21, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2005/ 
d20050714report.pdf. 
 27 See Adam Zagorin & Michael Duffy, Inside the Interrogation of Detainee 063, TIME, 
June 12, 2005, available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/printout/ 
0,8816,1071284,00.html; see also INTERROGATION LOG DETAINEE 063, Nov. 23, 2002,  
http://www.time.com/time/2006/log/log.pdf (presenting a partially-redacted copy 
of the interrogation log); see also Steve Miles, Medical Ethics and the Interrogation of De-
tainee 063, 7 AM. J. BIOETHICS 3, available at http://www.bioethics.net/journal 
/j_articles.php?aid=1140 (discussing this interrogation from a medical ethics per-
spective).  
 28 See Zagorin & Duffy, supra note 27. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Susan Okie, Glimpses of Guantanamo-Medical Ethics and the War on Terror, 353 
New Eng. J. Med. 2529, 2530 (2006). 
 31 Id. 
 32 Luke Mitchell, God Mode, HARPER’S MAGAZINE, July 2006, available at 
http://www.harpers.org/GodMode.html (Aug. 24, 2006).  
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seriously threatened by their hunger strike.33  Second, detainees have 
reportedly been forced to sit in their own urine and feces while 
strapped into a chair for “postfeed observation.”34  Third, the Penta-
gon regards hunger strikes and suicide attempts as acts of “asymmet-
ric warfare,”35 rather than signs of desperation on the part of those 
being detained for an indefinite period on grounds that are often still 
unclear.36  This view undermines the claim by the Assistant Secretary 
of Defense for Health Affairs, William Winkenwerder, Jr., M.D., that 
the Pentagon’s “intentions are good” and that they are “seeking to 
preserve life.”37  How can the policy of force-feeding be both ethically 
responsible medical treatment and a response tactic in asymmetric 
warfare? 
III.     THE EVOLUTION (OR REVOLUTION) OF LEGAL DOCTRINE 
In order to pave the way for the use of more aggressive interro-
gation techniques against so-called “high-value detainees” such as Al 
Qahtani, the Administration recognized that a number of legal hur-
dles needed to be addressed.  As a result, they embarked on what I 
have described elsewhere as a series of exercises in legal exceptional-
ism, in which legal protections and prohibitions were dispensed with 
on the grounds that they were geographically limited (spatial excep-
tionalism), that they did not apply to a particular group (collective excep-
tionalism), or that their true meaning had been hitherto misunder-
stood (interpretive exceptionalism).38  For present purposes, I will focus 
on just three examples, but there are many more. 
First and foremost, the Administration wanted to make sure that 
interrogators deploying these techniques would not incur criminal 
 33 George Annas, Hunger Strikes at Guantanamo—Medical Ethics and Human Rights 
in a “Legal Black Hole,” 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1377, 1379–80 (2006). 
 34 Id. at 1377; Nancy Sherman, Holding Doctors Responsible at Guantanamo, 16 
KENNEDY INST. OF ETHICS J. 199, 201 (2006). 
 35 BBC News, Guantanamo Suicides “Acts of War”, June 11, 2006,  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/5068606.stm. 
 36 Mark Denbeaux et al., No-Hearing Hearings   CSRT: The Modern Habeas Corpus? 
An Analysis of the Proceedings of the Government’s Combatant Status Review Tribunals at 
Guantanamo, Nov. 2005, http://law.shu.edu/news/final_no_hearing_hearings_ 
report.pdf (finding Department of Defense documents indicate that “[t]he Govern-
ment did not produce any witnesses in any [Combatant Status Review Tribunal] 
hearing and did not present any documentary evidence to the detainee prior to the 
hearing in 96% of the cases”). 
 37 Mitchell, supra note 32. 
 38 See Jonathan H. Marks, 9/11 + 3/11 + 7/7 = ? What Counts in Counterterrorism?, 
37 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 559, 578–83 (2006). 
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responsibility for torture.  This objective led to the August 2002 
memorandum from then-Assistant Attorney General Jay Bybee to 
then-White House Counsel Alberto Gonzalez, entitled Re: Standards of 
Conduct for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. 2340–2340A.39  The document 
narrowly defined physical torture to require pain “equivalent in in-
tensity to the pain accompanying serious physical injury, such as or-
gan failure, the permanent impairment of a significant bodily func-
tion, or even death.”40  For pain or suffering to rise to the level of 
mental torture, the memo added, “it must result in significant psycho-
logical harm of significant duration, e.g. lasting for months or even 
years.”41  Even if these thresholds are crossed and the interrogator 
knows they are being crossed, the memo contends that the interroga-
tor would not be guilty of torture under U.S. criminal law “if causing 
such harm is not his objective.”42  Nor would he have committed tor-
ture, according to the memo, if he “could show that he acted in good 
faith by taking steps such as surveying professional literature, consult-
ing with experts, or reviewing evidence gained from past experience.”43  
On the view set out in this memo—which was not revoked and re-
placed by the Department of Justice until after photographs of de-
tainee abuse at Abu Ghraib had been published44—the advice of be-
havioral science experts would be critical, at the very least, in order to 
insulate interrogators from domestic criminal liability.45
 39 Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to 
Alberto R. Gonzales, White House Counsel, Re: Standards of Conduct for Interroga-
tion under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A (Aug. 1, 2002), available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/dojinterrogation 
memo20020801.pdf [hereinafter Bybee Memo].  Sections 2340–2340A, which define 
the criminal offense of torture in the United States, were enacted in order to comply 
with the United States’ obligations under the Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984).  See H.R. Rep. No. 
103-482, at 229 (1994)(Conf. Rep.).  The drafters of the Bybee memo drew on (and 
were admittedly facilitated by) understandings made by the United States when it 
ratified the Convention in 1994.  See Sanford Levinson, “Precommitment” and ”Post-
commitment”: The Ban on Torture in the Wake of September 11, 81 TEX. L. REV. 2013, 2036–
38 (2003).  The text of the ratification instrument is available at http:// 
www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/6/cat/treaties/convention-reserv.htm. 
 40 Bybee Memo, supra note 39, at 1. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. at 4. 
 43 Id. at 8 (emphasis added). 
 44 Although the document was revoked in June 2004, it was not formally replaced 
until December 2004, just days before the confirmation hearings of Attorney General 
Alberto Gonzales.  See Memorandum from Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney 
General to James B. Comey, Deputy Attorney General, Re: Legal Standards Applica-
ble under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A (Dec. 30, 2004), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/dagmemo.pdf. 
 45 See Bybee Memo, supra note 39, at 8. 
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Having tried to narrow the definition of torture, the Administra-
tion continued to emphasize that the United States does not tor-
ture.46  However, that still left the prohibition on CID treatment or 
punishment as a potential impediment to more aggressive interroga-
tion strategies.  As a party to both the ICCPR47 and the Torture Con-
vention,48 the United States has committed itself to the prohibition 
against CID treatment, as well as torture.  The ICCPR clearly states 
that this is an obligation to which no exception is permitted,49 and 
the Torture Convention imposes an obligation on parties to review 
interrogation rules to ensure that they do not result in CID treat-
ment.50  When the United States ratified both treaties, it made reser-
vations defining CID to mean cruel and unusual treatment or pun-
ishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution.51  The Bush Admini-
stration took the view that these reservations served not only to rede-
fine the type of conduct that would be considered CID, but also op-
erated to limit the geographic scope of the Unites States’ 
international obligations so that they did not apply to aliens detained 
outside the United States.52  This view created, in effect, a “legal black 
hole” into which Guantanamo Bay, nominally leased by the United 
States from Cuba, conveniently appeared to fall.53  This was the posi-
tion which Senator John McCain sought to address in the so-called 
“McCain Amendment,” now section 1003 of the Detainee Treatment 
 46 See, e.g., Statement by the President on United Nations International Day in 
Support of Victims of Torture, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/06/ 
20030626-3.html (June 23, 2003) (stating that the “United States is committed to the 
world-wide elimination of torture and we are leading this fight by example”). 
 47 ICCPR, supra note 1. 
 48 Torture Convention, supra note 2. 
 49 For an authoritative interpretation of the ICCPR on this point, see Human 
Rights Committee, General Comment No. 20 (1992), ¶ 3, available at http:// 
www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/6924291970754969c12563ed004c8ae5?Open
document (last visited Feb. 5, 2007). 
 50 Torture Convention, supra 2, arts. 11 & 16. 
 51 For the text of the United States’ ratification of the Torture Convention, see 36 
CONG. REC. S10091 (1990), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/6/ 
cat/treaties/convention-reserv.htm.  For the text of the United States’ ratification of 
the ICCPR, see http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/treaty5_asp.htm (last visited 
Nov. 25, 2006). 
 52 See Gonzales Nomination Transcript, available at http://www.humanrights 
first.com/us_law/etn/gonzales/statements/gonz_testimony_010604.htm (last visited 
Mar. 30, 2006). 
 53 See Johan Steyn, Guantanamo Bay: The Legal Black Hole, 53 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 1–
15 (2004). 
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Act of 2005.54  Its provisions were intended to make clear that the 
prohibition of CID treatment applies irrespective of the nationality 
and geographic location of the detainee.55  But when President Bush 
signed the Detainee Treatment Act into law, he issued a presidential 
signing statement declaring that the Administration would interpret 
the detainee provisions “in a manner consistent with the constitu-
tional authority of the President to supervise the unitary executive 
branch and as Commander in Chief and consistent with the constitu-
tional limitations on judicial power.”56  This firm assertion of presi-
dential power naturally raised serious doubts about the practical im-
pact of the legislation on the Administration’s detention and 
interrogation policy.57
Another important doctrinal reformulation—or exercise in legal 
exceptionalism—concerns the Geneva Conventions.  Common Arti-
cle Three of the Geneva Conventions provides protections that have 
long been understood as the low watermark for treatment of detain-
ees, irrespective of their status.58  Although so-called unlawful com-
batants are not entitled to the full array of protections applicable to 
prisoners of war, they are to be protected from cruel, humiliating, or 
degrading treatment and from outrages on personal dignity.59  They 
are also to be treated humanely.60  The formal position of the Ad-
 54 See Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-48, § 1003, 119 Stat. 2680, 
2739–2744 (2005). 
 55 See id. 
 56 Statement of President George W. Bush Upon Signing of H.R. 2863, Dec. 30, 
2005, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/releaseas/2005/12/10551230-8.html;  
see also T.J. Halstead, Cong. Res. Serv., Presidential Signing Statements: Constitutional and 
Institutional Implications, Sept. 20, 2006, available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/ 
crs/natsec/RL33667.pdf (analyzing the impact of signing statements). 
 57 It should be noted that a provision similar to the McCain Amendment also ap-
pears in the Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600.  
However, the Military Commissions Act is problematic for several other reasons, 
some of which are discussed below.  See notes 65–69 and accompanying text; see also 
Human Rights Watch, Q and A: Military Commissions Act of 2006, available at 
http://hrw.org/backgrounder/usa/qna1006/usqna1006web.pdf (briefly analyzing 
and critiquing the Military Commissions Act) [hereinafter Human Rights Watch]. 
 58 See, e.g., International Committee for the Red Cross, Commentary on Geneva Con-
vention III, Article 3, http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/COM/375-590006?OpenDocument 
(last visited Mar. 14, 2007); Michael John Garcia, Cong. Res. Serv., The War Crimes 
Act: Current Issues, Oct. 2, 2006, available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL33 
662.pdf; see also Ruth Wedgwood & R. James Woolsey, Law and Torture, WALL ST. J., 
June 28, 2004, at A10. 
 59 Third Geneva Convention, supra note 9, art. 3. 
 60 Id.  A similar obligation is found in Article 10 of the ICCPR, which provides 
that “[a]ll persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with 
respect for the inherent dignity of the human person.”  ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 10. 
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ministration, determined in February 2002, was that the Geneva Con-
ventions did not apply to detainees who are members of Al Qaeda, 
because Al Qaeda is neither a state nor a party to the Conventions.61  
However, that position was unequivocally rejected by the Supreme 
Court of the United States in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld in June 2006.62  The 
Department of Defense responded to this decision with a memoran-
dum calling for a review of directives and policies to ensure compli-
ance with Common Article Three.63  But just a few weeks later, in Sep-
tember 2006, the President publicly criticized the provisions of 
Common Article Three for being too vague.64  Congress addressed 
the President’s concerns later that month, passing the Military Com-
missions Act of 2006 (“MCA”).65  The MCA purports to confer on the 
President the authority to “interpret the meaning and application of 
the Geneva Conventions.”66  It remains to be seen how the President 
will respond to this provision.  But there is a real danger that the Ex-
ecutive will view it as providing carte blanche to define Article Three’s 
protections narrowly.  Although the MCA states that “[n]othing in 
this section shall be construed to affect the constitutional functions 
and responsibilities of . . . the judicial branch of the United States,”67 
this provides little comfort given the MCA’s attempts to strip the fed-
eral courts of habeas corpus jurisdiction over detainees,68 and to pre-
 61 Office of the White House Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: Status of the Detainees 
at Guantanamo, Feb. 7, 2002, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/ 
2002/02/20020207-13.html. 
 62 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2794–95 (2006). 
 63 Memorandum from Gordon England, Deputy Secretary of Defense to the Sec-
retaries of the Military Departments et al., Application of Common Article 3 of the 
Geneva Conventions to the Treatment of Detainees in the Department of Defense 
(July 7, 2006), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug2006/ 
d20060814comm3.pdf. 
 64 The President acknowledged that the “Supreme Court's ruling [in Hamdan]  
. . . said that we must conduct ourselves under the Common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Convention.”  He added: “And that Common Article 3 says that there will be no out-
rages upon human dignity.  It's very vague.  What does that mean, ‘outrages upon 
human dignity?’  That's a statement that is wide open to interpretation.”  Transcript 
of Sept. 15, 2006, Press Conference of the President, available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/09/ 20060915-2.html. 
 65 Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600. 
 66 Id. § 6(a)(3)(A). 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. § 7.  See also Gerald L. Neuman, The Military Commissions Act and the Detainee 
Debacle: A Response, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. ONLINE 33 (2007), http://www.harvardilj.org/ 
online/105 (arguing that Congress did not have the power to permanently abrogate 
the writ of habeas corpus) and Robert M. Chesney, Judicial Review, Combatant Status 
Determinations, and the Possible Consequences of Boumediene, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. ONLINE 
62 (2007), http://www.harvardilj.org/online/110 (observing that the “slowly grind-
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vent them from invoking the Geneva Conventions “as a source of 
rights” in domestic litigation.69  If the President does narrowly rede-
fine the scope of protections in the Geneva Conventions, it is there-
fore likely to be some time before a federal court will be given the 
opportunity to correct this.  That delay will be too long, not just for 
detainees at Guantánamo Bay and elsewhere, but also for health pro-
fessionals with whom they have contact. 
Whatever the Administration’s interpretation of the Geneva 
Conventions, health professionals would be well-advised to remember 
that international legal norms—as commonly understood by other 
nations and, in the case of the Geneva Conventions, as authoritatively 
interpreted by the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(“ICRC”)70—will be violated by more aggressive interrogation strate-
gies long before the mental and physical health or well-being of de-
tainees are implicated.  For example, the prohibition of outrages on 
personal dignity in Common Article Three was clearly breached by 
soldiers who placed underwear on the heads of detainees or forced 
them to assemble naked in pyramid formation.71  Second, medical 
personnel may be complicit in the commission of grave breaches of 
the Geneva Conventions—also known as war crimes—if they advise 
on or monitor the use of interrogation tactics that qualify as torture 
or inhuman treatment or that “willfully cause great suffering.”72  War 
crimes attract universal jurisdiction.73  So even if health professionals 
ing process of developing and stabilizing our detainee laws and policies unfortu-
nately is not yet near its conclusion”).  
 69 Id. at § 5.  In particular, this section seeks to prevent the Geneva Conventions 
from being invoked as a source of rights in habeas corpus or other civil proceedings 
against the United States, and any of its current or former officers, employees, or 
agents.  Id. 
 70 INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW—TREATIES 
OF DOCUMENTS 1 (2005), http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/CONVPRES?OpenView 
(ICRC’s authoritative commentary on the Geneva Conventions). 
 71 BG FURLOW & LT. GEN. SCHMIDT, INVESTIGATION INTO FBI ALLEGATIONS OF 
DETAINEE ABUSE AT GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA DETENTION FACILITY 19 (June 9, 2005) 
(indicating that Guantánamo Bay detainee, Al Qahtani, “was forced to wear a 
woman’s bra and had a thong placed on his head during interrogation”).  For the 
infamous image of a human pyramid at Abu Ghraib, which has become emblematic 
of detainee abuse in the war on terror, see New Yorker, at http:// 
www.newyorker.com/online/slideshows/slideshows/040510onslpo_prison_02 (last 
visited Feb. 10, 2007). 
 72 See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 9, art. 130, available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/ b/91.htm; for a discussion of the War Crimes 
Act in the United States, see also Garcia, supra note 58.  
 73 For a more detailed discussion of universal jurisdiction and its theoretical 
foundations, see Jonathan H. Marks, Mending the Web: Universal Jurisdiction, Humani-
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were not concerned about potential prosecution in the United 
States,74 they would be ill-advised to ignore the possibility of being ar-
rested and tried while visiting another country. 
IV.     LAW AND MEDICAL ETHICS 
In the face of the Administration’s efforts to circumvent interna-
tional legal protections for detainees in the war on terror, the voice 
of professional ethics is especially important.  Professional ethics 
should not be an entirely autonomous enterprise.  In particular, ethi-
cal codes for physicians, psychologists, and other health care profes-
sionals should incorporate basic standards that reflect fundamental 
protections found in international human rights law and the laws of 
war.75  The Report of the American Psychological Association’s Task 
Force on Psychological Ethics and National Security in July 2005 no-
tably failed to do this.  Proscriptions against psychologists’ participa-
tion in abusive interrogation were not defined by reference to inter-
national law.  They were merely tied to “applicable” U.S. rules and 
regulations as “developed and refined” since 9/11.76  When one re-
calls the administration’s efforts to “refine” legal norms, the dangers 
inherent in this approach are manifest.  The report also fails to rec-
ognize that since the vast majority of detainees in the war on terror 
are foreign nationals, the propriety of their treatment is far more 
likely to be judged by international standards than by domestic ones, 
particularly if the latter are more lax. 
tarian Intervention and the Abrogation of Immunity by the Security Council, 42 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 445 (2004). 
 74 The Military Commissions Act also amends the War Crimes Act.  Military 
Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600.  For a brief summary 
of the material revisions, see Human Rights Watch, supra note 57. 
 75 See Leslie London et al., Dual Loyalty Among Military Health Professionals, 15 
CAMBRIDGE Q. OF HEALTHCARE ETHICS 381, 385–86 (2006) (discussing the value of a 
human rights perspective).  In the remainder of this section, I will argue that human 
rights should be the foundation of a health professional’s ethical obligations, but not 
the limit of those obligations. 
 76 REPORT OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION PRESIDENTIAL TASK 
FORCE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL ETHICS AND NATIONAL SECURITY (2005), available  
at http://www.apa.org/releases/PENSTaskForceReportFinal.pdf [hereinafter 
PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE]; see also Tara McKelvey, First Do Some Harm, AMERICAN 
PROSPECT, Sept. 1 2005, http://www.prospect.org/web/printfriendly-
view.ww?id=10110 (critiquing the task force, many of whose members had military or 
national security affiliations); Michael Benjamin, Psychological Warfare, SALON.COM, 
July 26, 2006,  http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2006/07/26/interrogation/ 
index.html; Mark Benjamin, Psychologists’ Group Still Rocked by Torture Debate, 
SALON.COM, Aug. 4, 2006,  http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2006/08/04/apa/. 
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It is possible simply to tie ethical constraints on health profes-
sionals to international legal prohibitions—an approach taken in the 
United Nations Principles of Medical Ethics.77  For example, physi-
cians are prohibited from using their knowledge and skills to assist in 
an interrogation that adversely affects the health or condition of a de-
tainee and is “not in accordance with the relevant international in-
struments.”78  These instruments would obviously include the Geneva 
Conventions, the ICCPR, and the Torture Convention.  But giving le-
gal norms the last word on the limits of professional conduct leaves 
psychiatrists and psychologists without clear guidance in the face of 
disagreements between lawyers and policymakers about the applica-
tion of those norms.  The efforts to redefine the scope and meaning 
of the Geneva Conventions and the prohibition of CID treatment in 
core human rights treaties—discussed above—provide two powerful 
illustrations of this point.79
Some codes of professional ethics impose firm constraints on 
health professionals, irrespective of the applicable legal norms.  For 
example, the World Medical Association’s Regulations in Times of 
Armed Conflict state that it is unethical for physicians to “[w]eaken 
the physical or mental strength of a human being without therapeutic 
justification” or to “[e]mploy scientific knowledge to imperil 
health.”80  It is difficult to understand how a physician with these pro-
hibitions in mind would have felt able to participate in the kinds of 
aggressive interrogation stressors deployed at Guantánamo Bay.  At 
the very least, the express purpose of coercive counter-resistance tac-
tics such as prolonged isolation and sleep deprivation was to weaken 
 77 Principles of Medical Ethics Relevant to the Role of Health Personnel, Particu-
larly Physicians, in the Protection of Prisoners and Detainees Against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 37/194, 
Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/37/194 (Dec. 18, 1982), available at http://www.un.org/ 
documents/ga/res/37/a37r194.htm. 
 78 Id. at princ. 4. 
 79 See supra Part III. 
 80 WORLD MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, REGULATIONS IN TIMES OF ARMED CONFLICT ¶ 2 
(2006), available at http://www.wma.net/e/policy/a20.htm [hereinafter REGULATION 
IN TIMES OF ARMED CONFLICT].  These provisions were in effect in 2002 when the ag-
gressive interrogation strategies were introduced at Guantánamo Bay.  See Amnesty 
International, Ethics Codes and Declarations Relevant to the Health Professions, 
ACT 75/05/00, at 18 (4th ed., 2000).  Following the revelations of physician partici-
pation in interrogation in the war on terror, two more instances of unethical behav-
ior were added to the list in May 2006.  The regulations now state that it is also un-
ethical for a physician to “[e]mploy personal health information to facilitate 
interrogation[,]” or to “[c]ondone, facilitate or participate in the practice of torture 
or any form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.”  REGULATION IN TIMES OF 
ARMED CONFLICT, supra, at ¶2(d) and (e).  The latter, in particular, should already 
have been obvious. 
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the mental and physical strength of detainees.81  In light of this, the 
American Medical Association (“AMA”) might have been expected to 
respond clearly and speedily to revelations of the involvement of 
American physicians in aggressive interrogations. 
However, the AMA did not formally take a position on the role 
of physicians in interrogation until the summer of 2006.82  The new 
ethical guidelines provide that “[p]hysicians must neither conduct 
nor directly participate in, or monitor an interrogation, because a 
role as physician-interrogator undermines the physician’s role as 
healer.”83  However, physicians are permitted to participate in “devel-
oping effective interrogation strategies for general training pur-
poses,” provided those strategies are humane and respectful of indi-
viduals’ rights, and do not “threaten or cause physical injury or 
mental suffering.”84  The American Psychiatric Association adopted a 
similar position in May 2006, prohibiting psychiatrists from “direct 
participation” in interrogation, defined to include “being present in 
the interrogation room, asking or suggesting questions, or advising 
authorities on the use of specific techniques of interrogation with 
 81 See Bloche & Marks, Doing Unto Others as They Did Unto Us, supra note 14 (dis-
cussing the source of the aggressive interrogation strategies deployed at Guantánamo 
Bay). 
 82 See Jonathan H. Marks, The Silence of the Doctors, THE NATION, Dec. 26, 2005, 
available at www.thenation.com/docprem.mhtml?i=20051226&5=marks (critiquing 
the AMA’s failure to speak out sooner). 
 83 AM. MED. ASS’N, OPINION OF THE COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS: 
PHYSICIAN PARTICIPATION IN INTERROGATION (2006), available at http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/475/cejo4i06.doc.  This followed the revision to 
the World Medical Association’s Declaration of Tokyo (Guidelines for Physicians 
Concerning Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punish-
ment in Relation to Detention and Imprisonment) in May 2006 to provide that 
“[t]he physician shall not use nor allow to be used, as far as he or she can, medical 
knowledge or skills, or health information specific to individuals, to facilitate or oth-
erwise aid any interrogation, legal or illegal, of those individuals.”  The revised Dec-
laration is available at http://www. wma.net/e/policy/c18.htm.    
 84 AM. MED. ASS’N, supra note 83. In a press release, the Chair of the AMA’s 
Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Priscilla Ray, M.D., stated that because “it is 
justifiable for physicians to serve in roles that serve the public interest,” the “AMA 
policy permits physicians to develop general interrogation strategies that are not co-
ercive, but are humane and respect the rights of individuals.”  See Press Release, 
AMA, New AMA Ethical Policy Opposes Direct Physician Participation in Interroga-
tion (Jun. 12, 2006), http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/16446.html.  
Neither the policy statement nor the press release addresses the question of whether 
physicians would ordinarily possess the expertise to advise on what interrogation 
techniques might generally be effective.  For a discussion of potential rationales for 
seeking medical advice on interrogation, see Marks, Doctors of Interrogation, supra note 
14. 
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particular detainees.”85  The psychiatrists’ association also permits its 
members to provide training to interrogators on “recognizing and re-
sponding to persons with mental illnesses, on the possible medical 
and psychological effects of particular techniques and conditions of 
interrogation, and on other areas within their professional exper-
tise.”86
Although the guidelines of both the AMA and the American 
Psychiatric Association therefore leave open the possibility of giving 
general advice and training to military and civilian personnel in ei-
ther law enforcement or intelligence branches, they make clear that 
physicians should stay out of the interrogation room—and, for that 
matter, any adjoining observation room—and that they should not 
give advice on specific interrogation techniques for specific detain-
ees.  By contrast, the August 2006 resolution of the American Psycho-
logical Association cleared the way for continued participation of psy-
chologists in individual interrogations at Guantánamo Bay. 
That resolution admittedly improves on the organization’s 2005 
task force report by providing that “psychologists shall work in accor-
dance with international human rights instruments relevant to their 
roles.”87  However, the remainder of the document simply ties the 
prohibitions on psychologists’ conduct to the basic legal prohibitions 
on torture and CID treatment.  Thus, psychologists must not “know-
ingly engage in, tolerate, direct, support, advise, or offer training” in 
such treatment.88  Nor shall they “provide knowingly any research, in-
struments, or knowledge that facilitates” such treatment.89  Nor shall 
they “knowingly participate in any procedure in which [such treat-
ment] is used or threatened.”90  And should they be present when tor-
ture or CID treatment occurs, they should try to stop the abuse and 
“failing that, exit the procedure.”91  In essence, these regulations re-
 85 Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Psychiatric Participation in Interrogation of Detainees: 
Position Statement (2006), available at http://www.psych.org/edu/other_res/ 
lib_archives/archives/200601.pdf. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Compare Am. Psychol. Ass’n, Resolution Against Torture and Cruel, Inhuman, 
and Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Aug. 9, 2006), available at 
http://www.apa.org/governance/resolutions/notortureres.html [hereinafter Reso-
lution Against Torture], with PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE, supra note 76 (the former in-
corporating human rights standards in the manner described in the text accompany-
ing this note, the latter stating that the Task Force “did not reach consensus on . . . 
[t]he role of human rights standards in an ethics code”). 
 88 Resolution Against Torture, supra note 87. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. 
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quire psychologists to obey the laws that bind us all.  Beyond that, psy-
chologists have only their consciences as a guide. 
The egregious abuse of detainees at Guantánamo Bay (and else-
where) raises real concerns about the role of psychologists in military 
interrogations, and emphasizes the need for firmer guidance.  Dr. 
Koocher, President of the American Psychological Association in 
2006, claims that psychologists are best placed to detect and prevent 
“behavioral drift” on the part of interrogators—that is, the slide into 
unprofessional and ultimately illegal behavior.92  But he fails to rec-
ognize that there are powerful social and institutional pressures on 
health professionals associated with the intelligence mission, includ-
ing military psychologists, that weigh heavily against intervening—
pressures that may well have been responsible for the Biscuit psy-
chologist’s failure to intervene in the aggressive interrogation of Al 
Qahtani.93
Put simply, interrogators are not the only people subject to “be-
havioral drift”—it may equally affect the psychologists charged with 
identifying and preventing it.94  Furthermore, the American Psycho-
logical Association’s new guidelines create the additional problem of 
what I call definitional drift.  By tying the principal constraints on psy-
chologists’ conduct to the prohibition on torture and CID treatment, 
the American Psychological Association’s summer 2006 resolution 
leaves psychologists vulnerable to drifting definitions, in particular 
the Administration’s efforts to redefine those norms.  This vulnerabil-
ity is particularly important in light of the Administration’s emerging 
preference for staffing Biscuits with psychologists rather than psy-
chiatrists95—a preference that predates, but has been reinforced by, 
 92 Gerald P. Koocher, Varied and Valued Roles, MONITOR ON PSYCHOL., July-Aug. 
2006, at 5, available at http://www.apa.org/monitor/julaug06/pc.html.  The same 
claim was made by the Director of the American Psychological Association’s Ethics 
Office in Stephen Behnke, Ethics and Interrogations: Comparing and Contrasting the 
American Psychological, American Medical and American Psychiatric Association Positions, 
MONITOR ON PSYCHOL., July-Aug. 2006, at 66, available at http://www.apa.org/ 
monitor/julaug06/interrogations.html. 
 93 The psychologist referred to here is discussed in the text accompanying note 
27 above.  See also Marks, Doctors of Interrogation, supra note 14. 
 94 Ironically, one of the members of the APA’s PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE has ar-
gued that its report (see note 76, supra) was itself the result of behavioral drift.  Tele-
phone interview with Jean Maria Arrigo, Ph.D, Founder, Project on Ethics and Art in 
Testimony, in Irvine, Cal. (Dec. 1, 2006). 
 95 DEP’T OF DEFENSE INSTRUCTION NO. 2310.08E, MEDICAL PROGRAM SUPPORT FOR 
DETAINEE OPERATIONS (2006), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/ 
i2310_08.pdf.  “[P]hysicians are not ordinarily assigned duties as [behavioral science 
consultants], but may be so assigned, with the approval of [the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Health Affairs], in circumstances when qualified psychologists are un-
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the new professional guidelines for physicians in general, and psy-
chiatrists in particular.96
V.     CONCLUSION 
The involvement of health professionals in interrogation is 
hardly new.  To give just one example, congressional testimony de-
scribes the role of an American physician in a form of torture known 
as the “water cure” in the war in the Philippines more than a hun-
dred years ago.97  There too, the victims of aggressive interrogation 
and torture were considered undeserving of the protections of the 
laws of war—a precedent for current exceptionalism expressly justi-
fied on grounds that enemy “insurgents” were “not civilized.”98  How-
ever, the systematic involvement of mental health professionals in 
U.S. Army interrogation practice was a significant development.  
Writing some months before this development occurred, M. Gregg 
Bloche—who trained as both a lawyer and a physician—observed that 
the “unreflective willingness of most Western physicians to employ 
clinical skills for myriad state purposes suggests that their ethical sen-
sitivity to the problem of extraclinical consequences does not greatly 
exceed that of their colleagues in countries where gross human rights 
abuse is endemic.”99  Bearing this in mind, he emphasized the need 
for the training of health professionals in both ethics and interna-
able or unavailable to meet critical mission needs.”  Id. at E2.2.  This follows the rec-
ommendation of Maj. Gen. Martinez-Lopez in April 2005 that physicians should not 
be assigned to Biscuits.  See OFFICE OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, ARMY, FINAL REPORT, 
ASSESSMENT OF DETAINEE MEDICAL OPERATIONS FOR OEF, GTMO, AND OIF (2005), 
available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2005/ 
detmedopsrpt_13apr2005.pdf. 
 96 See Ken Hausman, Military Looks to Psychologists for Advice on Interrogation, 
PSYCHIATR. NEWS, July 7, 2006, at 4, available at http://pn.psychiatryonline.org/cgi/ 
content/full/41/13/4 (discussing a statement made by the Assistant Secretary of De-
fense for Health Affairs, William Winkenwerder, Jr., to the effect that the different 
stances adopted by the psychologists’ and psychiatrists’ professional associations 
“contributed” to the Pentagon’s preference for staffing Biscuits with psychologists). 
 97 S. COMM. REC. ON THE PHILIPPINES, at 1527–32 (1899–1921) (testimony of 
Charles S. Riley), reprinted in HENRY F. GRAFF, AMERICAN IMPERIALISM AND THE 
PHILIPPINE INSURRECTION (1969) 72 – 80 and discussed in Marks, The Silence of the Doc-
tors, supra note 82, at 26. 
 98 S. COMM. REC. ON THE PHILIPPINES, at 558–64 (1899–1921) (testimony of Gen. 
Hughes) reprinted in HENRY F. GRAFF, supra note 97, 64–72; see also Marks, What Counts, 
supra note 38, at 579. 
 99 M. Gregg Bloche, Caretakers and Collaborators, 10 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE 
ETHICS 275, 278 (2001).  In a prescient note of caution, Bloche added that, if West-
ern physicians lack the appropriate ethical sensitivity, “their ability to avert complicity 
when state purposes turn troublesome or worse would not likewise differ greatly from 
that of their peers in more problematic settings.” Id. 
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tional human rights norms, for institutional mechanisms to nurture 
professional autonomy, and for international support from (among 
others) professional bodies.100
The importance of these recommendations is highlighted not 
only by revelations of health professionals’ complicity in detainee 
abuse, but also by recent statements of an experienced U.S. interro-
gator in the war on terror.  He notes that, in addition to the predict-
able pressure to support the military objectives of their colleagues, 
some health professionals may have financial anxieties too.  In the in-
terrogator’s words: 
Most of the PAs [physician assistants] or doctors that we use have 
been through medical school due to military scholarships.  They 
owe the military big bucks.  If they refused to aid us then they 
might be brought up on charges in an internal trial and would be 
forced to repay the military.101
 I do not intend to suggest that military health professionals are 
venal.  On the contrary, the vast majority pursue careers in the mili-
tary—despite the call of more lucrative private practice—for noble 
and altruistic reasons.  However, it would be foolish to pretend either 
that those financial pressures do not exist or that they cannot have an 
impact—even subconsciously—on an individual’s moral calculus.  
Furthermore, if social and financial pressures are not sufficient to 
bring on board health professionals despite their ethical qualms, in-
terrogators may use other means to procure their cooperation and 
compliance with the interrogation mission. 
We already know that military personnel at Guantánamo Bay 
were manipulated.  They were told that the detainees were “the worst 
of the worst.”102  According to Department of Defense documents, the 
vast majority had been handed over to U.S. forces by Pakistan or the 
Northern Alliance in exchange for large bounties—and most of them 
were not alleged to have committed any hostile acts against either the 
United States or its allies.103  Health professionals, in particular, are 
 100 Id. at 283. 
 101 The Arrigo Papers, supra note 12. 
 102 ERIK SAAR AND VIVECA NOVAK, INSIDE THE WIRE: A MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 
SOLDIER’S EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF LIFE AT GUANTANAMO 193 (2005). 
 103 MARK DENBEAUX ET AL., REPORT ON GUANTANAMO DETAINEES: A PROFILE OF 517 
DETAINEES THROUGH ANALYSIS OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DATA 2–3 (2006), available 
at http://law.shu.edu/news/guantanamo_report_final_2_08_06.pdf.  In addition, 
among the detainees were both children and the senescent.  See Oliver Burkeman, 
Children Held at Guantanamo, GUARDIAN, Apr. 24, 2003, available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/afghanistan/story/0,1284,942347,00.html; Times Wire 
Reports, Oldest Guantanamo Detainee Returns Home, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2006, A8 (re-
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not in a position to verify the provenance of a detainee.  Nor do they 
have the knowledge or expertise to assess the security threat posed by 
a particular detainee.104  So health professionals are in a position of 
ignorance and uncertainty that may be exploited.  The interrogator 
quoted above has also indicated that intelligence personnel may lie to 
health professionals: 
If the people are worried about doctors and psychologists aiding 
their own military in time of war, we can just have those who do 
work with us say we are not harming anyone.  If they worry about 
our methods then we say that all plans of interrogation have ap-
proved the tactics as non ‘stressful’.  As you can lie to a terrorist to get 
information then you can lie to any group that interferes with the job of 
making the people safe.105
 The interrogator also noted that if the use of doctors or physi-
cian assistants becomes problematic (or “too much,” in his words), 
interrogators “would then make use of our ParaRescue or Combat 
Medics for medical expertise in interrogations.”106  This is important 
since much of the discussion to date has been about the role of psy-
chiatrists and psychologists in interrogation.  Now that the AMA and 
the American Psychiatric Association have issued guidelines that seek 
to keep doctors out of the interrogation room—and empower them 
both legally and practically to refuse to participate107—the spotlight 
has focused on psychologists.108  But we would do well to remember 
that other types of health professionals may also be implicated. 
The recent proliferation of Department of Defense manuals and 
directives—most notably, the new Army interrogation manual prohib-
iting the use of “waterboarding,” hooding, and military dogs in inter-
rogation109—is presumably intended to suggest that the Administra-
tion is trying to redress the errors of the past.  But it is not clear how 
these policy documents will play out on the ground.  Arguably, they 
porting that Haji Nasrat Khan, an Afghan detainee, who was “at least 71” and uses a 
walker, has been sent home). 
 104 See London, supra note 75, at 386. 
 105 The Arrigo Papers, supra note 12 (emphasis added). 
 106 Id. 
 107 International humanitarian law prohibits states from requiring medical profes-
sionals to act contrary to their codes of ethics.  See Bloche & Marks, Doctors and Inter-
rogators at Guantanamo Bay, supra note 14; Marks, What Counts, supra note 38, at 582. 
 108 See, e.g., Michael Benjamin, Psychological Warfare, SALON.COM, July 26, 2006, 
http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2006/07/26/ interrogation/index.html; Mark 
Benjamin, Psychologists’ Group Still Rocked by Torture Debate, SALON.COM, Aug. 4, 2006, 
http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2006/08/04/apa/. 
 109 See FM 2-22.3 (FM 34-52), HUMAN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTOR OPERATIONS ¶ 5-75 
(2006), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm2-22-3.pdf.  
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may be of little relevance at the present time since detainees who 
have been held for years at Guantanamo Bay can no longer have ac-
tionable intelligence (even if they once did so), and there would be 
little point in interrogating them.  However, fundamental questions 
remain about detainees held by the CIA, whatever their location.  
The CIA is contesting the ACLU’s FOIA applications, so its practices 
are still shrouded in secrecy, and detainees in its custody will not 
benefit from the provisions of the new Army field manual.110  Fur-
thermore, in a recent radio interview, Vice President Cheney was 
asked: “Would you agree a dunk in water is a no-brainer if it can save 
lives?”111  Mr. Cheney replied: “It’s a no-brainer for me.”112  In the 
same interview, he agreed that the debate over interrogation tech-
niques was “a little silly.”113  These comments reveal a failure at the 
highest levels of government to internalize the most fundamental 
norms of human rights law and the laws of war.  In such an environ-
ment, health professionals should still be considered “at risk”—that 
is, in danger of becoming accomplices to the perpetration of war 
crimes in the counterterrorism mission.  Looking forward, one of the 
most important questions is: 
 
How will they respond? 
 
 110 Although current CIA interrogation guidelines are classified, previous CIA 
manuals have been made public.  See, e.g., KUBARK COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 
INTERROGATION (1963), available at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/ 
NSAEBB27/01-01.htm. 
 111 See Demetri Sevastopulo, Cheney Endorses Simulated Drowning: Says Use of Water 
Boarding to Get Terrorist Intelligence is “no brainer”, FIN. TIMES (London), Oct. 26, 2006, 
available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15433467/; see also Dan Eggen, Cheney 
Defends “Dunk in the Water” Remark Addressing Alarm Over the Comment, Vice President 
Says He Was Not Referring to Waterboarding, WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 2006, at A02, available 
at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/27/AR2006 
102700560.html. 
 112 See Sevastopulo, supra note 111. 
 113 Id. 
